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abstract: Isocr. 18 could have hired Isocrates, and the speaker of Lys. 21 and Eryxi-
machus could have hired Lysias as speechwriters for their rhetorical skills. However, it 
is probable that Isocrates’ choice to criticize the former colleagues of Isocr. 18 in his 
speech could have led the other two trierarchs to ask for Lysias’ help. This fact high-
lights the tensions between the elite when Athens was defeated in the Peloponnesian 
War. This antagonism between the trierarchs could be the beginning of the logographic 
competition between Lysias and Isocrates.
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A careful reading of the accounts of the historians Xenophon  2 and Dio-
dorus and the biographer Plutarch, which refer to the military engage-
ment at Aegospotami, allows us to remark on the important role the 
trierarchs played in the last naval battle of the Peloponnesian War. Then 
the surviving speeches also lead us to remark that two of Lysias’ clients, 
the speaker of Lys. 21 and Eryximachus (fr. L Carey) managed to escape 
from Aegospotami  3. One more man, the accuser of Callimachus in 
Isocrates’ speech 18, was one of those who escaped from Aegospotami. 
Thus, we have two of them getting involved with Lysias, while another 
one chose the services of Isocrates. In this paper I shall analyze the role 
of the trierarchs in the Hellespont. Then I will argue that the choice of 
these men to hire Lysias and Isocrates might be a result of these litigants’ 
attempt to find the best logographer. However, I will also argue that Iso-
 1 I am most grateful to Professor P.J. Rhodes for reading earlier drafts of this 
paper. Moreover, I thank Professor D. Whitehead for his comments.
 2 All references are to the Hellenica.
 3 Todd 2000, 233, n. 16 has remarked that «it is striking how many of Lysias’ 
clients claim to have been among the few who were quick-witted enough to escape from 
Aegospotami». Todd is wrong to count Nausimachus among Lysias’ clients, because he 
was only a witness (see Lys. XXI 9). 
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crates’ choice to expose the former colleagues of his speaker in Isocr. 18 
in the public eye in his speech could have led them to hire Lysias. Such 
an inquiry may appear to be rather narrow in focus. But its implications 
are, I believe, much broader than this, because it can shed more light on 
the tensions between the elite when Athens was defeated in the Pelopon-
nesian War. Finally, I will consider the possibility that the bad relation-
ship between the trierarchs was the beginning of the antagonism between 
Lysias and Isocrates. The basis of this analysis will be the speeches of the 
logographers themselves. 
The core of my argument is largely dependent on chronological con-
siderations. My thesis that Isocrates 18 and Lysias 21 should be consid-
ered companion speeches rests upon the assumption that the former was 
the earlier work. More specifically, I will base my analysis on Whitehead’ 
argumentation for dating Isocr. 18 late in the archon-year 403/2 or else 
early in 402/1  4. Lys. 21 is dated after 403/2  5. Eryximachus delivered his 
speech around 400-399  6.
The battle that decided the outcome of the Peloponnesian War took 
place in the region of the Hellespont. In 404 B.C. Lysander went to the 
Hellespont and was stationed at Lampsacus The Athenians followed him 
to the same area with one hundred and eighty ships and were stationed 
at Aegospotami (Xen. Hell. II 1, 20; Plut. Lys. 4, 4). The first day that 
the two fleets faced each other Lysander prepared everything for a naval 
battle (Xen. Hell. II 1, 22), but he did not put out to sea against the 
Athenians who waited him to fight them until it was late in the day, but 
then sailing back again to Aegospotami (II 1, 23). Lysander ordered his 
fastest ships to follow the Athenians, watch them when they embarked, 
and then sail away and report to him. Only when his spies return did 
he let his sailors disembark from the triremes (II 1, 24). Alcibiades 
saw the fleet of his fellow citizens from his fortress, realized their bad 
position, approached the Athenian camp and told the generals to move 
their ships to Sestus, where there was a harbour and a city. However, 
the Athenian generals, especially Tydaeus and Menander, ordered him 
to depart, because they were the generals and not him (II 1, 25-26; Diod. 
XII 105, 4)  7. Alcibiades told the trierarchs  8 who escorted him out of the 
camp that, if the generals had not talked to him in a bad way, he could 
 4 See Whitehead 2002, 75.
 5 See Kapellos 2014, 55-56.
 6 See Loening 1987, 107.
 7 See Kapellos 2009, 262.
 8 See Kapellos 2014, 9.
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have forced the Lacedaemonians to fight the Athenians unwillingly or to 
desert their ships. Some of these Athenians thought that what he said was 
just boasting; but others that it was likely, since he had merely to bring 
up his numerous Thracian archers and horsemen to assault by land and 
confound the enemy’s camp (Plut. Alc. 30, 2-4; Nep. Alc. 8, 2). 
Alcibiades’ revelation of his plans to the trierarchs was not coin-
cidental. These men had already realized the difficult position of the 
Athenian fleet and were responsible for the preparedness of their vessel 
for a prospective battle  9. The Athenian generals did not have a plan of 
action on how to force the Spartans to fight. Lysander took advantage of 
the Athenian stalemate and attacked his enemies. The reasons that led 
to the Athenian defeat are a controversial issue because of the different 
accounts given by Xenophon and Diodorus  10. In both accounts Lysander 
caught the Athenians by surprise. As the Spartan commander refused to 
respond to the challenge of the Athenians to fight, the insubordination of 
the crew members grew and the more he postponed this conflict the more 
his enemies despised him and scattered around the Cheronnesus trying 
to find provisions (Xen. Hell. II 1, 27). When Lysander attacked, Conon 
was the first to realize that the Spartan fleet had begun its attack and 
tried to make his men board their ships by a call to arms or by entreating 
or forcing them (Plut. Lys. 11, 3-4). The Athenians were far away from 
their ships. Lysander captured almost the entire fleet on the shore. Only 
Conon, the Paralus and seven more ships around him managed to escape 
(Xen. Hell. II 1, 28). According to Diodorus, Lysander relied on desert-
ers for information. The general Philocles began a manoeuvre with thirty 
ships and gave orders to the trierarchs for the immediate boarding of the 
crews on their ships, but they did not carry out his orders. Thus, before 
the bulk of the Athenian fleet was ready to follow his ships, Lysander 
took the Athenians in the midst of Philocles’ manoeuvre (XIII 106, 1-3). 
This general had a precise course of action in mind to face Lysander,  11 
but he failed because of the insubordination of the trierarchs. When 
Lysander attacked he reached the Athenian ships so close that the Athe-
nians did not have the time to arrange themselves against him (XIII 106, 
5). Conon and ten more ships managed to escape (XIII 106, 6). In both 
accounts there are some similarities. First, the Athenians were surprised 
by the coordinated attack of the Lacedaemonians. Second, Lysander 
 9 See Lys. XXI 9 with Kapellos 2014, 102.
 10 Many scholars argue that we should believe Xenophon’s account. See Gray 
1987, 78-79; Strauss 1983, 24-35; Bleckmann 1998, 572-580; Welwei 1999, 241.
 11 See Lotze 1964, 32; Ehrhardt 1970, 227; Kagan 1987, 391-392.
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captured easily the Athenians in the camp without even fighting in a real 
naval battle.  12 Third, despite the different number of ships that Xeno-
phon and Diodorus report, it was only Conon and some trierarchs who 
escaped from Aegospotami.
Both historians do not explain why Conon and these trierarchs 
were alert to Lysander’s attack. Davies estimates that during the 5th 
century  B.C. in Athens there were probably four hundred men who 
belonged to the liturgical class, and he recognizes seventy men who 
were obliged to undertake liturgies in the last third of the 5th century  13. 
Athens was not a face-to-face society  14, so we cannot be certain that the 
trierarchs who participated in the sea battle in the Hellespont knew each 
other beforehand. Nevertheless, Conon could have been connected with 
each one of them individually. This is so because the candidate trierarchs 
voluntarily presented themselves before the generals  15. Thus, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that the trierarchs met each other before leaving 
Athens. If this is not right, it is rather certain that there must have been 
some contact between them at Aegospotami before Lysander’s attack; 
otherwise it is difficult to explain how they managed to face the Spartan 
attack and sail to the open sea at the same time.
The necessary occasion for such cooperation between Conon and the 
trierarchs must have been created because of their need to find provi-
sions. The anonymous client of Lysias in speech 21 says that before 
Lysander’s attack it was difficult for him to restrain his crews when 
they saw almost all the others despise Lysander and disembark. We can 
speculate that before the Spartans attacked, the πεντηκόνταρχος, who 
was the treasurer of the pilot and responsible for buying and expenses, 
was going to Sestus to buy food, accompanied by some members of the 
crew  16. This allows us to suspect that Conon and the other trierarchs did 
the same. Thus, by having imposed discipline on their men, the Athenian 
general and the trierarchs reacted successfully to Lysander’s attack.
A little later on, the group of ships cooperated once more. Conon, 
now in flight with the nine ships, realized that the entire cause was 
lost, so he took one more thing before leaving. He put up in Abarnis 
and captured the main sails of Lysander’s ships (Xen. Hell. II 1, 29) in 
order to prevent any pursuit of him. This plan succeeded because of the 
 12 See Kapellos 2012, 97-98.
 13 See Davies 1981, 32-33.
 14 See Ober 1989, 31-33; Hunter 1994, 97-98.
 15 See Amit 1965, 110; Jordan 1975, 61-63; Rhodes 1982, 3.
 16 See Lys. XXI 9 with Kapellos 2014, 104-105.
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coordination between him and the trierarchs. We can identify four of 
them, the anonymous speaker of Lys. 21  17, Nausimachus, who was saved 
by the speaker of Lys. 21  18, Eryximachus  19, and the anonymous speaker 
of Isocrates  20. The names of the other five are not known. Afterwards, 
Conon went to Cyprus from Aegospotami  21. It is probable that the trier-
archs followed him to the island. If they did not go to Cyprus, it does not 
really matter for our case but the fact that they returned to Athens as a 
team possibly in consultation with Conon does  22. During all this time the 
trierarchs must have developed personal ties, since they acted as a group 
or they became friends  23. 
When the trierarchs finally went back home, the Athenians became 
angry even at them  24 and raised the accusation that they should be held 
responsible for the defeat  25. This reaction of the Athenians surprised 
and embittered the trierarchs who while talking to one another, declared 
their disappointment because, instead of being congratulated, they were 
held responsible for the defeat  26. The existence of personal contacts 
among them proves that their personal ties must have become stronger. 
Later on, Athens was forced to surrender and the Thirty came into 
power  27. The speaker of Lys. 21 remained in the city under the regime 
of the Thirty  28. The speaker of Isocr. 18 and Eryximachus also remained 
in Athens during the Thirty  29. After the restoration of democracy these 
three trierarchs were engaged in lawsuits  30.
 17 For a full survey of the speaker of Lys. 21 as trierarch see Kapellos 2014, 14-16.
 18 See n. 2 above.
 19 For the identification of Eryximachus as one of the trierarchs who escaped see 
Kapellos 2009, 270, n. 73.
 20 For the speaker of Isocr. 18 as a trierarch see Davies 1971, D.20, 595.
 21 Diod. XIII 106, 6.
 22 For the association between Conon and the trierarchs after Aegospotami see 
Kapellos 2009, 271.
 23 Cf. Konstan 1996, 74 for good will between men as the beginning or source of 
philia.
 24 See Lys. XXI 9 with Kapellos 2014, 96. 
 25 See Kapellos 2014, 16.
 26 See Kapellos 2014, 16-17, 97.
 27 See Krentz 1982, 50.
 28 For the political activity of the speaker of Lys. 21 see in detail Kapellos 2014, 
17-24.
 29 This is certain for Isocr. 18 because the procedure used in his trial is paragraphe. 
For the procedure of paragraphe in this speech see MacDowell 1978, 214-216. For details 
regarding this case Carawan 2013, 91-103. For Eryximachus cf. Loening 1987, 106.
 30 The speaker of Lys. 21 held some public office and at the end of his term he 
was accused of bribe-taking and additionally of embezzling public money (see Kapellos, 
2014, 31-33). Eryximachus was examined in his dokimasia (see Dover 1968, 5; Loening 
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The choice of the logographer is our first concern here. The first of 
the trierarchs who found himself in court was the speaker of Isocr. 18. 
We know only very few things about the contact between a client and 
his logographer  31, so we cannot give a definitive explanation as to why 
a client hired a particular speechwriter among so many in Athens  32. In 
general, we know that logographers wrote speeches for the benefit of 
those who appeared in court  33. Two of them were Lysias and Isocrates. 
Lysias was already a distinguished writer in 415 B.C.  34 and he must 
already have written some of his speeches. Isocrates was at an earlier 
stage of development as an orator compared to Lysias at this moment. 
Thus, we can simply say that Isocr. 18 chose to hire Isocrates because he 
considered him a good logographer. A speechwriter would give strategic 
advice to his client, initially, on whether to go to law at all, and if so, under 
what procedure; then tactical recommendations on formulating the case 
to best advantage  35. In this occasion Isocrates guided the speaker and 
then wrote the speech for him  36. When the speaker read his speech  37, 
he understood that he would argue in court that when he returned to the 
Peiraeus (κατέπλευσα) with his colleagues, he did not resign his duties as 
trierarch (κατέλυσα). On the contrary, the other trierarchs were glad to 
be relieved of their duties and were discouraged over the situation, and 
not only had they regretted (μεταμελομένων) the loss of what they had 
already spent but also they were trying to conceal the remainder. Moreo-
ver, judging that the commonwealth was completely ruined, they were 
looking out for their private interests. However, the speaker’s decision 
was not the same as theirs; he persuaded his brother to be joint-trierarch 
with him, and they paid the crew out of their own means and proceeded 
to harm the enemies (XVIII 59-60). Finally, when Lysander proclaimed 
1987, 106-107). The client of Isocrates was accused of depriving Callimachus of a sum 
of money (Isocr. XVIII 5-6, 9). 
 31 According to Plut. Mor. 504c, a litigant met Lysias before the trial and com-
plained about the content of his speech. Theophrastus says that his character, the com-
plaining man’, was sure to find fault with his speechwriter for omitting so many of his 
pleas even when he wins a suit by a unanimous verdict (XVII 8). Cf. Todd 2005, 101: 
«what went on behind the scenes was harder to monitor and this is the context in which 
men like Lysias made it their task to ghostwrite speeches for the benefit of clients who 
would then deliver them in their own person».
 32 Cf. Worthington 1993, 67, n. 9, arguing that many speeches must have circu-
lated in Athens.
 33 See Lavency 1957, 127.
 34 See Dover 1968, 33.
 35 See Whitehead 2004, 155.
 36 See Usher 1976, 31-40; Winter 1973, 34-40; Worthington 1993, 67-72.
 37 Cf. n. 30.
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that if anyone imported grain to the Athenians, he would be punished 
with death, the speaker says that he and his brother were so zealous 
for the city’s welfare that although no one else dared to bring in even 
his own, they intercepted the grain that was being brought in to the 
Spartans and discharged it at the Peiraeus. In recognition of these ser-
vices the Athenians voted that the speaker and his brothers should be 
honored with crowns, and that in front of the statues of the eponymous 
heroes they should be proclaimed as the authors of great blessings 
(XVIII 61). These claims deserve analysis. First, I want to focus on the 
term κατάλυσις. According to [Dem.] L 11, τριήρους γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται 
κα τάλυσις εἶναι, πρῶτον μέν, ἐὰν μὴ μισθόν τις διδῷ, δεύτερον δέ, ἐὰν εἰς 
τὸν Πειραιᾶ μεταξὺ καταπλεύσῃ· ἀπό λειψίς τε γὰρ πλείστη γίγνεται, οἵ τε 
πα ραμένοντες τῶν ναυτῶν οὐκ ἐθέ λουσιν πάλιν ἐμβαίνειν, ἐὰν μή τις αὐτοῖς 
ἕτερον ἀργύριον διδῷ ὥστε τὰ οἰκεῖα διοικήσασθαι. Thus, κατάλυσις means 
the abnormal dissolution of a ship by the trierarch himself or his crew  38. 
In the case of the speaker of Isocr. 18 this means that the nine trierarchs 
who returned to the Peiraeus did not have to follow the orders of any 
general to serve overtime simply because all the Athenian commanders, 
except for Adeimantus, were executed at Aegospotami  39. It was up to 
the conscience of each trierarch to decide if he would continue to serve 
his fatherland or not. The allegation about the regret of the trierarchs 
was an ironical statement, made to suggest that the other trierarchs were 
so depraved as to feel metameleia over losing money and not over failing 
in their duties  40. This statement must also be true given that the lack of 
food and the influx of the poor into the city caused the resentment of 
the aristocrats  41. Thus, it was not a surprise that the trierarchs chose to 
conceal their properties  42. Moreover, the speaker’s claim that Lysander 
forbade the importation of grain must be true. Diodorus reports that the 
Peloponnesians decided, since the siege of Athens was presenting dif-
ficulties, to withdraw their armies from Attica and to conduct a blockade 
at a distance with their ships, in order that no grain (σῖτος) should come 
to the inhabitants. When this was done, the Athenians came into dire 
want of everything, but especially of food, because this had always come 
to them by sea. Since the suffering increased day by day, the city was filled 
with dead, and the survivors sent ambassadors and concluded peace with 
 38 See Robertson 1927, 115-116.
 39 See Kapellos 2013, 464-472.
 40 See Fulkerson 2004, 251.
 41 See Ober 1985, 53-54.
 42 Cf. Christ 1990, 147-169.
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the Lacedaimonians (XIII 107, 3-4). Xenophon was in Athens at the time 
of the blockade and knew that nine ships escaped from the Hellespont, 
but he does not report what Isocrates’ client says, because this trierarch 
and his few men did not change the course of events  43. However, it 
is noteworthy that he emphasizes the problem of famine in Athens as 
Lysander’s blockade continued  44. Finally, Isocrates’ emphasis on the 
proclamation in the monument of the ten eponymous heroes is notewor-
thy. This monument served as a public notice board and was essential for 
the dissemination of official information  45, so the jurors must have been 
able to remember the identity of the speaker, even though Athens was 
not a face-to-face society  46. Therefore, this argumentation shows that 
Isocrates chose to convince the jurors that his client had a completely 
different response to the city’s misfortunes from that of his colleagues. 
This confirms the statement of Dionysius of Halicarnassus that Isocrates 
was: ἐν […] τοῖς δικανικοῖς […] πάνυ ἀκριβὴς καὶ ἀληθινὸς.
Let us compare Isocrates’ speech with the texts that Lysias wrote for 
the speaker of Lys. 21 and Eryximachus in order to see the problems 
he would create for them in their trials. Isocrates’ claim that all the trie-
rarchs who returned to the Peiraeus resigned from their duties weakens 
the argument of Lysias, who emphasizes in his speech for Lys. 21 the long 
time that his client served as a trierarch, the dangers that he faced and 
the money that he spent for the city  47. Perhaps one might object to this 
opinion, saying the speaker of Lys. 21 in XXI 9 and Eryximachus also 
use the verb κατέπλε[υ-]σα (ll. 102-103), which could mean that Lysias 
did not hesitate to say that his clients returned to Athens after Aegos-
potami. On the other hand, the speaker of Lys. 21 says that he came back 
to Athens during the archonship of Alexias in 405/4 B.C. but he does 
not say what he did until he assumed the liturgy of gymnasiarch within 
 43 See Kapellos 2018, 401.
 44 The historian reports the following: Lysander sailed to the various cities, and 
ordered all the Athenians whom he met to go back to Athens (II 2, 2); the Athenians 
were deprived of σίτου because of the blockade (II 2, 10); many Athenians were dying 
out of starvation (II 2, 11); the Athenians were disappointed when the ephors at Sparta 
did not accept their terms of peace because they believed that many more Athenians 
would die because of the famine (II 2, 14); Theramenes delayed his stay in Lysander 
because he knew that if the Athenians were deprived of τὸν σῖτον they would come to an 
agreement with the Spartans easier (II 2, 16); when Theramenes and the other Athenian 
ambassadors returned from Sparta, the Athenians feared that they would not bring any 
agreement while more and more citizens died because of the famine (II 2, 21).
 45 See Camp 2003, 17.
 46 See Ober 1989, 31-33; Hunter 1994, 97-98.
 47 See Lys. XXI 3 with Kapellos 2014, 68-70.
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a time of less than nine months  48. Given that he abandoned his post, as 
we know, Lysias would never reveal to the jurors his secret like Isocrates. 
Eryximachus also does noτ specify when he returned, at least in the two 
fragments of the speech that have been preserved. In my opinion, Lysias 
would not mention that Eryximachus left his post under the blockade of 
Lysander anyway.
On the other hand, this argumentation leads us to further thoughts 
about Isocrates’ client himself. When that speaker read the speech, 
he must have realized what he was going to tell against his former col-
leagues  49. He knew that he could not count the trierarchs as his friends 
and thus hope that they would support him as witnesses  50, because he 
could not force them to appear as such in court  51. Moreover, the elite 
who found themselves in court had to represent themselves and their 
past deeds as conforming to an ideal picture of the citizen who was 
always friendly to the demos. None of them would agree to testify «yes, 
I had suspended my loyalty towards the demos at that time; it was only 
our older colleague who remained faithful and now it is right that he is 
criticizing us». Regarding Lys. 21 this is certain, if we consider that Lysias 
chose to disregard the fact that his client abandoned his post illegally and 
preferred to suspend his philotimia towards the demos at that moment  52. 
Should someone think that this is not right, we must think of another 
trial. In 400 B.C. Andocides was put on trial. None of those who were 
guilty of mutilation of the Herms was called as a witness at Andocides’s 
trial. This was not because these conspirators were not available. Four of 
them had returned to Athens by then, so they could have been called on 
to appear at the trial. Yet, Andocides did not call them  53. Inevitably, the 
statement of Isocrates’ client must have created some tension among the 
trierarchs, who would not be on amicable terms with their old colleague 
from now. 
Should someone wonder why Isocrates chose such an extreme posi-
tion for his client concerning the other trierarchs, I think that we must 
 48 See Lys. XXI 3 with Kapellos 2014, 71-72.
 49 My argument is based on an anecdote in Plutarch Mor. 504c, where it is said 
that Lysias wrote a speech for a client, but when this man read it his speech three times 
he found many arguments with which he disagreed. There is no reason to believe that 
this was not the response of Isocrates’ client too.
 50 See Lavency 1957, 126.
 51 For the issue that a litigant could not force an unwilling witness to appear in 
court see Todd 1990, 24.
 52 See Kapellos 2014, 17, n. 118.
 53 For these remarks see MacDowell 1962, 173.
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consider the political climate of the era and the difficulty of former mem-
bers of the Three Thousand to prove that they were not against demo-
cracy. Two examples suffice to prove this. First, Poliochus, a member 
of the Three Thousand, started a trial against the sons of Eucrates, who 
also remained in the city, probably to show their faith in democracy by 
prosecuting former comrades  54. Second, the accusers of Lys. 21, who 
were probably supporters of the regime of the Thirty, decided to pros-
ecute him  55. In the speeches I examined, the trierarchs are not of course 
the opponents of the speaker of Isocr. 18. However, the fact that that 
speaker turned against his former colleagues, who had also remained 
in the city during the oligarchic regime, cannot be doubted, as we saw 
earlier. Moreover, Isocrates could not easily convince the jury that his 
client was not a supporter of the Thirty for the following reasons: (a) he 
was a friend of the Thirty’s basileus; (b) the oligarchic Ten are his best 
witnesses and (c) he and his witnesses are sure to be called oligarchs by 
Callimachus. This handling of the speaker’s activity during the oligarchy 
by Isocrates seems rather clumsy and depends more on flattering the jury 
for the observance of the amnesty than on his clients’ lack of oligarchic 
sympathies. Obviously, Isocrates had little choice about how to treat his 
client’s past, so he defended him in this way  56. Thus, the orator regarded 
it as convenient to make the jurors disregard the weakness of his defence 
by illuminating his client’s efforts for the state, while it was a democracy, 
at the end of the speech.
What remains for us is to explore the reasons that could have led the 
other two speakers to hire Lysias. A first explanation could be Lysias’ 
growing reputation. The speech that Lysias delivered against Eratos-
thenes, one of the former oligarchs (Lys. XII), will have brought his name 
to the attention of prospective clients  57. In our case it is noteworthy that 
Lysias himself refers to the moment of the Athenian defeat at Aegos-
potami, saying ἐπειδὴ ἡ ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο (XII 43). 
Logographers had to devise the most effective schemes, strategies, and 
arguments for any given purpose, and this is what Lysias did by creating 
an argument about the battle of Aegospotami. Lysias’ prospective clients 
such as these two knew that there had not been any real naval battle at 
Aegospotami  58. This could have led them to ask for Lysias’ legal help  59. 
 54 See Loening 1987, 131-132.
 55 See Kapellos 2014, 34.
 56 These remarks are due to Lateiner 1981, 155-156.
 57 Carey 1989, 3.
 58 See above pp. 86-88.
 59 Cf. above n. 35.
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Lysias knew that the events at Aegospotami were relevant for the cases of 
his two clients and included references to their action in the Hel lespont  60. 
A second reason could be that the elite knew each other because of their 
social relations. In our case this is very interesting because we can find 
a connection between Lysias and Isocrates. Particularly, we know that 
Lysias belonged to the Socratic circle  61, while it is very probable that 
Eryximachus also participated in the same company. This man could 
have been one of those who mutilated the Herms  62 and then returned to 
Athens in 406 B.C. Davies rejects this identification, saying that: (a) the 
physician Eryximachus would have appeared in the trial of Andocides if 
he was alive at that time and (b) the trierarch fails to make any reference 
to the financial ruin he would have suffered in 415, had he been the phy-
sician  63. Loening also attempts to corroborate Davies’ opinion. He claims 
that when Andocides calls witnesses to affirm that his information had 
not been responsible for the implication of certain men in the profanation 
of the Mysteries, Alexippus, a nephew, rather than Eryximachus, the son, 
testifies that Acoumenus had been denounced by Lydus  64. Moreover, 
Loening argues that it is improbable that a man who had suffered exile 
and confiscation for his involvement in the scandal of the Mysteries could 
have attained a new position and wealth in the city in such a short time.
However, these arguments are not compelling  65. First, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that Eryximachus was dead in 400  B.C., when 
Andocides’ case was tried. This possibility is already included in Davies’ 
syllogism and in fact reverses his claim. If this is true, we are not sur-
prised that Alexippus was willing to testify that Lydus had lied against 
Acoumenus, since his cousin could not do so. Second, we must pay 
attention to the fact that some of those who had been accused of pro-
faning the Mysteries had returned to Athens. Phaedrus and Axiochus 
returned to the city in 406 B.C.  66 Adeimantus also returned to Athens at 
that time, because when Alcibiades returned to the city, he was already 
there (Xen. Hell. I 4, 21). Finally, Alcibiades himself returned to Athens 
 60 See Lys. XXI 9, Eryx. ll. 100-104 (Rylands).
 61 See Nails 2000, s.v. Lysias, 190-194.
 62 It is possible to believe that the Athenians took such a decision by considering 
the evidence given in 415 by Agariste and the slave Andromachus as false. For this 
point see Dover 1968, 32.
 63 See Davies 1971, 462.
 64 Loening 1987, 107.
 65 For skepticism regarding Davies’ arguments see also Nails 2002, 144.
 66 See Dover 1968, 32.
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(I 4, 20). Third, Eryximachus was indeed a trierarch at Aegospotami  67. 
This means that Eryximachus and Lysias could have met each other in 
social meetings when Socrates was present  68. Regarding the speaker 
of Lys. 21 we have no evidence that he belonged to the Socratic circle, 
while nothing in Lysias’ speech betrays Socratic influence  69. Finally, a 
third reason could have led the speaker of Lys. 21 and Eryximachus not 
to hire Isocrates, and this could be that the orator had accused them in 
his speech in defence of Isocr. 18. We do not have the proofs for that. 
On the other hand, there were two ways for the two trierarchs to know 
what Isocrates had written against them. First, the Athenians used to 
watch trials as bystanders  70; so the speaker of Lys. 21 and Eryximachus 
could have heard their former colleague castigating them in the trial even 
though he had not named them. Second, the two trierarchs could have 
read Isocrates’ speech. We know that forensic speeches were generally 
circulated as books, were seen as works of literary distinction and were 
widely read in educated circles  71 even for pleasure  72. Thus, it is possible 
to understand why both of them hired Lysias. 
Now we must return to the issue of witnesses in favour of a litigant. 
The trial of Lys. 21 shows how things were different for this speaker 
regarding witnesses in comparison with Isocr. 18. Lysias could call 
Nausimachus as a witness in favour of his client. Although the speaker 
of Lys. 21 presented his relationship with Nausimachus as quite formal  73, 
this was not true, since the trierarchs who had fled from the Hellespont 
came closer or became friends, as we saw earlier  74. In fact, Nausima-
chus testified in favour of his old colleague, the speaker of Lys. 21, as 
an act of solidarity and as a means of resistance against the aggression 
of the demos  75. Should someone think that Lysias could have called 
 67 See Kapellos 2009, 270, n. 73.
 68 Other clients of Lysias are also related to the Socratic circle. For instance, the 
sister of Lys. 19 married her first cousin, the Phaedrus of Plato’s dialogues, who was 
closely linked to Eryximachus. Lys. 19 was connected to the Socratic circle. For the 
association of Lys. 19 and Eryximachus with Socrates see Nails 2012, s.v. Phaedrus, 
232.
 69 This is not surprising. Lysias was not willing to listen to Socrates’ advice not to 
attack Polemarchus in court in order to take revenge for the loss of his brother Pole-
marchus (see Howland 2004, 179-208).
 70 See Lanni 1997, 183-189.
 71 See Lavency 1957, 128.
 72 See Usher 2004, 113-123.
 73 See Lys. XXI 9 with Kapellos 2014, 99.
 74 See above p. 89.
 75 See Lys. XXI 10 with Kapellos 2014, 107-108.
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more trierarchs as witnesses, since the Athenians considered that if one 
witness guaranteed the truth, more guaranteed it better  76, we should 
consider this a deliberate choice on the part of the orator. Lysias must 
have decided that Nausimachus’ testimony was much more important 
than that of Eryximachus or any other because it was Nausimachus who 
was saved by Lys. 21 at Aegospotami  77. Unfortunately, Eryximachus’ 
speech is fragmentary, so we do not know if any of the former trierarchs 
appeared as his witness in his trial. In any case, it is plausible to suggest 
that Lysias would not like to call as a witness the speaker of Isocr. 18. In 
fact, we can doubt if this man would like to appear in court given that he 
spoke against his former colleagues in his trial, as we saw earlier.
Finally, I would like to consider the possible consequences this 
choice of the trierarchs could have had in the relationship between Lysias 
and Isocrates. We must take into account that Isocrates also belonged 
to the Socratic circle  78. This allows us to think that Isocrates could have 
heard that Lysias wrote defence speeches for two of the trierarchs who 
had escaped from Aegospotami. Isocrates knew that he had chosen to 
accuse them in his speech 18. Moreover, it is probable that he had met 
Eryximachus in Socrates’ company some day and must have learned the 
reason why he was not asked by this man to defend him, because such 
contacts in the Socratic circles were a reality  79. Isocrates must have been 
annoyed by the fact that his rhetorical stance was reproached. We have 
no proof for that but we do know something about his character and 
his response to a similar case. When Demosthenes wrote his speeches 
Against Androtion and Against Timocrates as part of a campaign to dis-
credit the school of Isocrates  80 the rhetorician responded to these attacks 
in his speeches On the Peace and Antidosis  81. Thus, we could wonder if 
the juxtaposition of the two speeches of Lysias and the speech written by 
Isocrates could be seen as the beginning of the feud between Lysias and 
Isocrates which followed at this time  82.
 76 See Mirhady 2002, 264.
 77 Note that the anonymous client of Lysias says twice that he saved Nausimachus 
(Lys. XXI 9 and 11). See Kapellos 2014, 99.
 78 See Nails 2012, s.v. Isocrates, 179.
 79 In Pl. Phdr. 227a we read that Phaedrus meets Socrates after having met Lysias 
first. Cicero tells us that Lysias composed a defence speech for Socrates and offered it 
to him to learn for use at his trial (De Oratore I 231).
 80 See Rowe 2000, 278-302.
 81 See Rowe 2002, 149-162.
 82 The two orators wrote speeches for the opposing parties in specific cases. 
Lysias accused the son of Alcibiades (Lys. XIV), while Isocrates defended him (Isocr. 
XVI). Moreover, a famous trial took place in 400 B.C. between a certain Nicias and 
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However, this competition did not last for long. Plato presents 
Socrates prophesying the future of Isocrates in 415 B.C.  83. For the phi-
losopher Isocrates went beyond the oratory of Lysias; there was a nobler 
character in his make-up. As a result, Socrates would not be surprised if 
as Isocrates advances in years, even in the rhetorical sphere at which he 
is currently trying his pen, he was to surpass all others who have turned 
their hands to that field. Moreover, if these themes do not satisfy him, 
Socrates says, perhaps a more divine impulse may carry Isocrates on to 
greater things, because there is a kind of philosophy innate in his intellect 
(Phaedrus 278e8-279b3). It is a fact that Isocrates wrote only six dicanic 
speeches, among them speech 18  84. On the other hand, this is an ide-
alized picture of Isocrates given that the orator afterwards abandoned 
logography. If his success-rate was low, this must have contributed to his 
decision to abandon logography as soon as circumstances allowed  85. In 
any case, Isocrates did his best to disown his logographic past later on  86. 
We do not know whether the relationship of the speaker of Isocr. 18 
and his colleagues changed or not  87, but this did not matter for Lysias. 
From now on, the speechwriter’s treatment of the military engagement at 
Aegospotami would become a common argument for those of his clients 
who wanted to enhance their ethos in court  88.
 aggelos kapellos
 University of Ioannina
 agkap75@yahoo.g
Euthynous, involving a deposit of three talents which the plaintiff Nicias claimed that 
it had not been returned in its entirety. Lysias’ speech, save for the opening lines, has 
been lost (fr. LVII Carey). Isocrates’ speech is extant as 21 (Pros Eythynun amartyros). 
Lysias wrote a speech in defence of Pasion, while Isocrates wrote the speech Trapeziti-
cus against him. See Trevett 1990, 25. Dusanic 1992, 34-35 also argues that the rivalry 
between Timotheus and Iphicrates corresponds to the rivalry between Lysias and Iso-
crates, which is hinted in the Phaedrus and the Republic.
 83 This is the dramatic date of the dialogue. See Dover 1968, 33. 
 84 For the activity of Isocrates as a logographer see Cruces - Gonzalez 2000, 895-
896.
 85 Whitehead 2004, 166.
 86 See Kennedy 1994, 176.
 87 For proof that enmities could be healed see Rhodes 1996, 26.
 88 See Kapellos 2012, 100, n. 28. For other references to Aegospotami in the 
corpus Lysiacum see Lys. VI 46, XII 43, XIV 38, XVI 4, XVIII 4, XIX 16.
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